Ask Philosophers

Recently a question was asked about the nature and value of philosophy. I was surprised that only one panelist chose to respond. In his response, Gordon Marino wrote the following: "There are people who make their living doing philosophy who are really into it because they enjoy unlocking intellectual puzzles and building models."

By not replying, is the implication that the other panelists agree with this assessment of what professional philosophy is? And if this is an accurate characterization of professional philosophy, why is it a department at the college level? It sounds more like the description for one of the many enrichment activities offered after school at the local elementary and middle schools. It seems to me that this cannot be an accurate description of the field, as the amount of professional philosophy done would not thereby be accounted for by the economic demand for it.

Thoughts?

Response from: Alexander George
Readers might be interested in some of the attempts by philosophers to explain their work, their problems, their philosophical passions to a non-professional audience that have appeared in The New York Times blog "The Stone": http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/category/the-stone/.

Is it a logical contradiction for something to come from nothing? I've heard that this causal principle is intuitive and something a rational person cannot deny. However, is it metaphysically possible for something to indeed come from nothing? Is that a logical contradiction concerning cause and effect? If we're not strictly talking about cause and effect, is it still possible for something to come from nothing? Is an event always contingent upon a cause?

Response from: Andrew Pessin

Great question. I don't have an answer. But some thoughts depend on how you frame things. If by "causation" you have a certain model in mind (e.g. where something is transferred from cause to effect) then it does seem contradictory to say that 'something comes from nothing' -- if that is taken to mean 'nothing causes something to come into being' -- for that seems to require both that something be transferred from cause to effect (by the word 'causes') yet that there be nothing to be transferred (since 'nothing' is said to be THE cause) .... But who is to say that 'causation' should be understood on that model? And even that model would not rule out the metaphysical possibility of something coming from nothing, if what that means is 'something comes into existence uncaused' -- there does not seem to be a contradiction, or at least not an obvious one, in the latter, since no 'causation' is being implied .....

hope that's a useful start!

ap

Recently I tried to explain to a friend what interested me about Hume's 'problem of induction.' I told him how if we want to give an argument for the superiority of inductive reasoning (concluding x's are always P, based on observed instances of x's that are P) over, say, anti-inductive reasoning (concluding x's are not always P, based on observed instances of x's that are P) then we would have to give either an inductive argument or else a deductive argument. We cannot give such a deductive argument, I told him, and to give an inductive argument like 'inductive reasoning has led to good results in every observed instance' would be circular.

He replied with the question 'why is there no problem of deduction?' He asked why he couldn't give a similar argument that any defense of deductive reasoning (concluding C based on premises that logically entail C) over, say, anti-deductive reasoning (concluding not C based on premises that logically entail C) needs to be either deductive or inductive. A deductive argument would be circular, and an inductive argument is inadequate because of Hume's problem.

I can't shake the feeling that something is wrong with his reply. Is there - or is there something wrong in both of our arguments? If not, then why is 'the problem of induction' so much more famous than 'the problem of deduction'?

Response from: Andrew Pessin
Rather than offer a response to this excellent question, let me just refer you to a paper whcih essentially raises and discusses the very same problem: Susan Haack's "A Justification of Deduction," from the journal Mind in 1976 (try vol 85, n. 337 I believe). Also, Lewis Carroll (as in "Alice in Wonderland" has a similar, more fun version of it -- "What the Tortoise said to Achilles" -- also in Mind, in 1895 or so ... Check them out!
ap

What is the difference between a word having two meanings and a word that has an "alternative" meaning? For intance, is MOUSE a word that has two meanings (first meaning: "a small rodent of a species found all over the world that has a brown or greyish-brown coat and a long mostly hairless tail"; second meaning: "a hand-held device for working with a computer by controlling a pointer on the screen") or does it have only one meaning ("either a small rodent of ..... or a hand-held device for ....")?

Response from: Andrew Pessin

Interesting question. But I'm wondering what rides on the answer. And what is connected to the question. Of course, we begin by wanting to distinguish the meanings of the two relevant clauses you give ("small rodent," v. "hand-held device"). So, separately, you obviously hold that there are two meanings in play. Now in logic it may be true that, strictly speaking, the proposition "P or Q" is a distinct proposition from either of its disjuncts, and can happily count as a "single" proposition -- but we also recognize that it is compositional, composed of parts, so we can think of it as one compound proposition or as a disjunction of two simpler propositions. But these are perfectly consistent with each other, so we can happily accept both -- it is both one compound, and a disjunction of two simpler, proposition(s). No need to choose! Why not just say the same with respect to your example? In any case you can raise the same question even of the component meanings in your example - your 'rodent' version is implicitly a disjunction too, as is, probably, ultimately, the 'hand-held' example .....

ap

This question is vague. Possibly too vague. You decide. Interpret the question as you will, I have not narrowly defined each word. I recently decided to live the ethical life. I want to hold myself up to the standard of doing the best I can. My automatic interpretation of this is utilitarianism. In fact, this seems like the obvious answer to me. But as I can see, no one ethical system is completely accepted, not utilitarianism either. As someone who knows more than I do, do you think the first step to the ethical life for me is to study ethics, or to follow my gut instinct and use my basic understanding of utilitarianism or "as much happiness generated as possible" to guide me?

Response from: Allen Stairs

Good for you for taking what's right so seriously!

As for general advice, a few quick thoughts. First, though utilitarianism undoubtedly provides useful insights, it's not really clear that utilitarianism always gives the best answers. A quick example: the fact that a mafia leg breaker gets satisfaction and enjoyment from his work arguably carries no weight at all in deciding what's morally best. Perhaps the utilitarian can explain this, but only perhaps.

And that leads to the second point. It may be that the study of ethics tends to lead people to better moral decisions, but that's very doubtful. (Don't be so sure that the people on this panel know more than you do.) In any case, it's hard to believe studying ethics necessary for being good. Whether I'd turn to someone for moral advice and whether they've studied ethics don't have much to do with one another. But simply trusting one's gut isn't always best either; gut feelings are often wrong.

So what's the positive advice? A good deal of the time it's not hard to know how we ought to act. Don't be cruel; don't be inconsiderate; don't be dishonest; treat people fairly; try to put yourself in other's shoes. All those are mere rules of thumb, but for a good deal of daily life, they'll do. For harder problems, try to make sure you've got good information; remember that you have blind spots; do what you can to see things from more than one perspective; find out what thoughtful peope who've been in similar situations have to say.

There's no royal road here but often the problem is more a matter of motivation than of recognizing what's actually right. The fact that you're motivated to do what's right is surely a hopeful sign!

Hello.
Thanks for all the great answers so far.
A (seemingly) quick question. If everything is determined, does this mean that everything is necessary and nothing is contingent. Because if determined means 'could not be otherwise' then isn't that the same as saying it is necessary?
Thank you, Christina

Response from: Eddy Nahmias

Determinism is a thesis about the relations between states (or events) in the universe. A deterministic universe is one in which, holding fixed the past states (or events) and the laws of nature, there is only one possible future set of states (or events). So, it might appear that determinism means that nothing is contingent or could happen otherwise. But that appearance is misleading, because the past or the laws were not necessary and they could have been different. If they had been different than they actually are, then the future events would be different than they actually will be.

If determinism meant that everything is necessary, then it would mean that there is only one possible universe. Nothing could be or could have been different than it is. That doesn't fit with the way we think about possibility. There are lots of possible universes--lots of ways things might have been or might be. But if determinism is true, the only way the present or future could be different than they actually are is if the past or laws were different than they actually were. I think this actually accords with the way we think about most (or all) events in our universe. The tree fell in the forest at this time and in this way. Could it have fallen in a slightly different way (or time)? Sure, but only if something had been slightly different leading up to its falling--the speed or direction of the wind, the saturation of the ground, the strength of the roots, etc. But for those things to be different, earlier things would have had to be different. And so on.

Perhaps our decisions are no different (I'm assuming you had the issue of free will in mind when you asked this question). You consider various options about what to order for lunch (or what major to pick or career path to follow or whom to marry!) After deliberation, you decide on X. Could you have chosen Y? Well, if determinism is true, only if something had been slightly different, such as the considerations you thought about or the strength of certain desires you had. And for those to be different, something earlier would have had to be different. And so on. But determinism does not rule out those possibilities. And if determinism is false, then it seems your decisions could be different for no reason at all, which doesn't sound so great either.

Lots more to say, but I hope this gives you something to think about...

Hi I have a hairy one for you. Imagine if you will that you have a mystical experience and you encounter the Supreme, Ultimate Absolute i.e. God. And that you can ask this being any question you desire. But being a bit of a skeptic you ask it "what question should I ask you?" Would this constitute a good test or would I simply be acting cute and incur Gods wrath?

But in all seriousness if you did encounter a being claiming to be God, what would constitute proof?

I figure we would probably know anyway, because I can't envision God not installing some sort of Truth recognition factor, but then I've been influenced by a lot of New Age mumbo jumbo, so I want to know what a philosopher thinks.

Cheers Pasquale



Response from: Eddy Nahmias

I like the ploy of asking an apparent Supreme Being (SB), "What would be the best question to ask you?" but only if you can also make sure that the SB answers that question. How frustrating would it be if SB responded, "You should ask me, 'What is the meaning of life?'" and then laughed at you as you realized you'd used up your one and only question! But I don't see how this question would help you determine if the SB was really God or whether your vision was real or a hallucination, dream, or matrix-like experience induced by a powerful but not supreme being. Heck, you could ask me what question you should ask, and I could give you a good answer. (Ask what is the meaning of life!)

So, what would constitute proof that your vision of an SB was genuine? Nothing, if your standards are set at Descartes' level of proof--you could be dreaming or in a matrix and never be able to tell, no matter what the SB said or did. But you could use a more reasonable standard, like best explanation for the observed phenomena. So, you could ask the SB to produce effects that would be best explained by your having asked such a being to produce them--e.g., "Tomorrow, allow me to fly unassisted for an hour and cure malaria and the flu." When you fly and read headlines about the diseases being eradicated, that seems like good evidence that the SB you met is pretty supreme. If SB is not willing to produce such evidence, you should taunt him/her/it: "What's the matter, you're not supreme enough to do it? Come on, show me a sign!"

In some schools where I live, children are made to sing the national anthem every morning at school. Children who do not wish to do so can opt-out, in which case they are made to take their chairs outside the classroom, sit, and wait until the singing is over.

Those working for the education board claim that the possibility of opting out means that nobody is being forced to do anything.

Yet if the de facto situation is that children are made to sing the anthem, and that they are visibly segregated from the other students for their or their parents' choice, can that really be true? Is there no form of coercion going on whatsoever here? It seems that this situation is more coercive than an alternative, in which nobody sings the anthem at all. Is this perception correct?

Response from: Oliver Leaman

I wonder, because it might be argued that in general people would be expected to know the national anthem, and while provision should be made for those who do not wish to, it would be a shame if no-one could sing it at school. After all, it is not as though singing it is likely to coerce one into patriotic feelings that one would be better without, or even better with, since as we know however people are brought up often has very little to do with how they eventually behave or what they believe.

I used to teach in a school where a small group of students had to be removed from the classroom whenever Christmas was discussed, since it was held to be a largely secular holiday and they were the children of committed Christians who disapproved of this secularity. Should one have just not spoken about Christmas at all in order not to exclude them? How about if some parents object to music or sex education, should teachers not play music or provide sex education at all?

Exclusion is not desirable, but it preserves some balance between the wishes of individual parents and the desire of the education system to introduce children to central aspects of their culture, surely a worthwhile aim on the whole.

If I give money or time to a charitable organization then claim the donation on my taxes for a deduction or credit can my charitable act still be classified as such considering the fact that I receive some benefit from my actions?

Response from: David Brink
We need to separate the legal question of whether your ability to count your contribution to charity as a charitable contribution for purposes of tax deduction should depend on your motives for contributing from the moral question about whether the moral status of your contribution should depend in some way upon your motives. There are a number of reasons why the tax status of your contribution probably should not depend on your motives. It's more plausible to suppose that the moral status of your contribution can depend on your motives. Your motives in contributing seem most relevant to our assessments of your character and perhaps to the question whether your contribution is genuinely charitable or beneficent. The crucial question is whether you make the contribution only because of the tax deduction or whether the tax deduction is just a happy by-product of a donation you would have made anyway. If I would not have made the contribution but for the tax deduction that does seem to raise questions about whether my contribution is genuinely charitable and my motives are genuinely beneficent. But if I would have contributed anyway and the tax deduction is from my point of view a fortunate by-product, then it's harder to see how the tax deduction taints my charity or beneficence.

Of course, not everyone is purely charitable or beneficent. So we are likely to have more charitable contributions if we incentivize it, for instance, with tax deductions. A policy of deductions, rather than no deductions, will not raise the incidence of genuine charity of beneficence, but it will raise the level of contributions and aid. And presumably we care more about meeting needs than promoting charity. Charity is only a virtue because of need. Just as we should not maintain need to make charity possible, so too we should not eliminate incentives that increase aid in order to promote genuine charity and beneficence.